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INTRODUCTION 
More than one-third of the 580,000 homeless people in the United States 
are unsheltered.1 This population includes those who sleep on the street, in 
cars, in abandoned buildings, and in other places not intended for human 
housing.2 Some unsheltered homeless individuals choose to forego sleeping 
in a shelter, perhaps out of concern for their safety or because their work 
prevents them from abiding by a shelter’s curfew. Others, meanwhile, are 
forced to sleep in public spaces because of insufficient shelter capacity. 
The number of unsheltered homeless individuals has soared during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Homeless shelters across the country have closed due 
to the pandemic, and those that remained open saw an exodus of residents 
who feared exposure to the virus in close quarters.3 Given that the virus 
ultimately proved to be much less transmissible outdoors,4 this mass 
dislocation of homeless people may very well have saved lives. 
But living in public spaces risks devastating consequences. In cities across 
the United States, laws target basic human conduct that unsheltered homeless 
people perform in public, such as sleeping, camping, sitting, lying down, and 
loitering.5 These antihomeless laws impose a range of civil and criminal 
penalties on the conduct they prohibit; this Comment focuses on criminal 
laws, because prosecuting homeless individuals—a common occurrence6—poses 
 
1 See MEGHAN HENRY, TANYA DE SOUSA, CAROLINE RODDEY, SWATI GAYEN & THOMAS 
JOE BEDNAR, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., THE 2020 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT 
REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 1 (2021), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
2020-AHAR-Part-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/54V3-F9GS]. 
2 Homeless in America: Examining the Crisis and Solutions to End Homelessness: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 116th Cong. app. at 76 (2019) (prepared statement of Nan Roman, President 
and Chief Executive Officer, National Alliance to End Homelessness). 
3 See, e.g., Shelter Closings, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. (May 3, 2020), https:// 
www.nlihc.org/coronavirus-and-housing-homelessness/shelter-closings [https://perma.cc/J7D3-6GRL]; 
Stephanie Yang, Population in New York City Homeless Shelters Drops in Pandemic, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
9, 2020, 9:50 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/population-in-new-york-city-homeless-shelters-
drops-in-pandemic-11599652800 [https://perma.cc/H2Y7-B9GF] (reporting that homeless 
individuals in New York City “left the shelters in droves”). 
4 See Participate in Outdoor and Indoor Activities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/outdoor-
activities.html [https://perma.cc/P6C6-MBFK]. 
5 See NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS 2019: 
ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 12-13 (2019), http:// 
www.nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/HOUSING-NOT-HANDCUFFS-2019-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J6QC-6SGH]. 
6 See Bidish Sarma & Jessica Brand, The Criminalization of Homelessness: Explained, APPEAL 
(June 29, 2018), http://www.theappeal.org/the-criminalization-of-homelessness-an-explaineraa074d25688d 
[https://perma.cc/5QSJ-YC7C] (explaining that prosecutors “frequently charge” homeless individuals 
for violating antihomeless laws).  
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a particular risk: it undermines their ability to gain and maintain employment, 
the surest way out of poverty.7 
The perception that all homeless individuals are unemployed and 
uninterested in working is false. Nearly half of single homeless adults work,8 
and about ninety percent of those who do not have a job want one.9 Given 
these numbers, many homeless individuals would benefit if legal burdens, 
such as the antihomeless laws this Comment discusses, did not compound the 
challenges they face while working or looking for work.10 
Rendered politically powerless by their lack of resources,11 homeless 
individuals have turned to the courts to try to enjoin enforcement of these 
laws.12 Courts deciding these cases have looked to two Supreme Court 
decisions, Robinson v. California13 and Powell v. Texas,14 which limit the kinds 
of behavior that governments can criminally punish under the Eighth 
Amendment. Some courts have read Robinson and Powell as drawing a 
distinction between an act and a status, holding that the Constitution permits 
punishing a person for the former but not the latter. Relying on this 
distinction, these courts have upheld antihomeless laws that punish acts that 
further basic human needs rather than the status of being homeless.15  
 
7 See Gary Shaheen & John Rio, Recognizing Work as a Priority in Preventing or Ending 
Homelessness, 28 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 341, 344 (2007) (“Helping people get a job at a living 
wage is essential to end their homelessness.”); Employment and Homelessness, NAT’L COAL. FOR 
HOMELESS (July 2009), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/employment.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8QU5-PXME] (“[C]limbing out of homelessness is virtually impossible for those 
without a job.”). 
8 Stephen Metraux, Jamison D. Fargo, Nicholas Eng & Dennis P. Culhane, Employment and 
Earnings Trajectories During Two Decades Among Adults in New York City Homeless Shelters, 20 
CITYSCAPE, no. 2, 2018, at 173, 190. 
9 Julia Acuña & Bob Erlenbusch, Homeless Employment Report: Findings and Recommendations, 
NAT’L COAL. FOR HOMELESS (Aug. 2009), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/ 
homelessemploymentreport [https://perma.cc/6B24-ZKSL]. 
10 See generally Sarah Golabek-Goldman, Note, Ban the Address: Combating Employment 
Discrimination Against the Homeless, 126 YALE L.J. 1788, 1795 (2017) (“While homeless participants in 
this study described a number of challenges to obtaining employment, they frequently referred to 
discrimination based on homeless status as one of their most pressing problems.”). 
11 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 304 n.4 (1984) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“Though numerically significant, the homeless are politically powerless inasmuch as they lack 
the financial resources necessary to obtain access to many of the most effective means of persuasion.”). 
12 See infra Section II.B. 
13 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
14 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
15 At least four lower federal courts have adopted this interpretation of Robinson and Powell. 
See Glover v. City of Laguna Beach, No. 15-1332, 2016 WL 11520619, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2016) 
(“Plaintiffs cite no authority that persuades the Court . . . that criminalizing the acts of sleeping or 
camping in public places unconstitutionally criminalizes the status of being homeless.”); Ashbaucher 
v. City of Arcata, No. 08-02840, 2010 WL 11211481, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2010) (“Upon careful 
review of the holdings of Robinson and Powell . . . the Court concludes that the Eighth Amendment 
does not extend protection to involuntary conduct, such as camping overnight on public grounds, 
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Other courts, however, have read Robinson and Powell as creating a 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts, and as holding that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits punishing an individual for performing the 
latter. These courts have reasoned that antihomeless laws impermissibly 
punish involuntary behavior, but only when a city has failed to provide 
enough shelter space to house its entire homeless population.16 Most notably, 
in Martin v. City of Boise, the Ninth Circuit, the only court of appeals to have 
addressed the issue, held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited Boise, 
Idaho, from prosecuting homeless individuals for sleeping on public property, 
unless the city’s shelter capacity exceeded its homeless population.17 In 
December 2019, the Supreme Court denied Boise’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari, leaving the issue unresolved on the national level.18 
This Comment argues that given the lack of constitutional protections 
against antihomeless laws, prosecutors are better positioned than courts to 
mitigate the harm such laws inflict.19 Prosecuting working or job-seeking 
 
attributable to Plaintiffs’ homeless status.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 11211527 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2010); Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1234 (E.D. Cal. 2009) 
(“A decision in Plaintiffs’ favor would set precedent for an onslaught of challenges to criminal 
convictions by those who seek to rely on the involuntariness of their actions.”); Joyce v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 858 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“[H]omelessness does not 
analytically fit into a definition of a status.”), vacated as moot, 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996). 
16 At least five lower federal courts have adopted this interpretation of Robinson and Powell. See 
Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 616 (9th Cir.) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for 
homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019); Jones v. City 
of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The Robinson and Powell decisions, read 
together, compel us to conclude that . . . [criminally punishing] homeless individuals who are sitting, 
lying, or sleeping in Los Angeles’s Skid Row because they cannot obtain shelter violates the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause.”), vacated pursuant to settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Kohr v. City of Houston, No. 17-1473, 2017 WL 3605238, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2017) (enjoining 
the City of Houston from enforcing its ban on sheltering in public because the homeless plaintiffs 
“are involuntarily in public, harmlessly attempting to shelter themselves—an act they cannot 
realistically forgo”); Anderson v. City of Portland, No. 08-1447, 2009 WL 2386056, at *6 (D. Or. 
July 31, 2009) (“[I]t seems a reasonable proposition under the Eighth Amendment that homeless 
persons should not be subject to criminal prosecution for merely sleeping in public at any time of 
day.”); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (“Because being does not 
exist without sleeping, criminalizing the latter necessarily punishes the homeless for their status as 
homeless.”), rev’d and vacated on other grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 
810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“[A]rresting homeless people for harmless acts they are 
forced to perform in public effectively punishes them for being homeless.”). 
17 Martin, 920 F.3d at 616. 
18 Martin, 140 S. Ct. at 674. 
19 This Comment also uses the term “prosecutor” to refer to police officers when they are 
responsible for prosecuting the government’s case. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Opinion, When 
the Police Become Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/12/26/opinion/police-prosecutors-misdemeanors.html [https://perma.cc/HP6F-NMAA] (“In 
hundreds of misdemeanor courts in at least 14 states, police officers can file criminal charges and 
handle court cases, acting as prosecutor as well as witness and negotiator.”). 
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homeless individuals—those closest to escaping homelessness—creates 
significant barriers to their efforts to achieve sustainable independence.20 
Therefore, prosecutors should decline to file charges when they know that a 
homeless defendant is seeking to enter or is already in the workforce. If 
charges are filed, homeless defendants who can prove their employment or 
their job-seeking status should be diverted out of the criminal justice system 
and into homeless court programs. 
Part I begins by introducing the two topics central to this Comment: 
antihomeless laws and criminal law. Section I.A surveys the devastating 
effects of antihomeless laws on homeless individuals. The criminalization of 
their conduct raises fundamental criminal law questions, which are explored 
in Section I.B. Next, Part II discusses Robinson and Powell, the pivotal 
Supreme Court cases that distinguish between laws that punish people for 
what they do (which are constitutional) and those that punish people for who 
they are (which are unconstitutional). Part II then dives into lower federal 
courts’ misapplication of these two decisions to antihomeless laws, with a 
focus on the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Martin.  
Part III argues that the constitutional remedy devised by the Ninth 
Circuit is misguided from a doctrinal and public policy perspective. To 
provide context for the alternative solution this Comment proposes to the 
dilemma antihomeless laws pose, Part IV explains the role prosecutorial 
discretion plays in the criminal justice system. Finally, the Comment 
concludes by proposing that prosecutors use their discretion to not prosecute 
working or job-seeking homeless individuals for violating antihomeless laws. 
I. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS 
Homelessness “is an exceptionally complex phenomenon even when it is 
not exacerbated by a global pandemic.”21 Many people experiencing 
homelessness face a Hobson’s choice between living in a dangerous homeless 
shelter and living without shelter at all.22 Others have no choice: they are 
 
20 In jurisdictions where police or prosecutorial discretion is already a defining feature of the 
enforcement of antihomeless laws, using a homeless offender’s employment status as the touchstone 
for exercising that discretion serves important governmental benefits, discussed infra Section IV.B. 
21 Frank v. City of St. Louis, 458 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1092 (E.D. Mo. 2020). 
22 Internal reports of life inside New York City’s 30th Street Men’s Shelter reveal some of the 
dangers that the sheltered homeless population faces: 
A client openly smokes crack in bed. Another runs from room to room, flicking 
light switches. 
One resident whacks another in the head with a lock stuffed inside a sock. A handgun 
is hidden in a construction barrier just outside the building’s entrance. 
 
1976 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 1979 
forced to live in public spaces due to insufficient shelter capacity. The 
challenges that homeless individuals face are compounded by criminal laws 
that target people who live outdoors. Homeless individuals have successfully 
argued in court that when shelter space is unavailable, they should not be 
blamed or punished for sleeping in public. These arguments raise the question 
of which aspects, if any, of homeless individuals’ life-sustaining conduct can 
be criminally punished. This Part begins to answer that question. It provides 
an overview of antihomeless ordinances in the United States, followed by a 
discussion of the criminal law elements that comprise these offenses. 
A. An Overview of Antihomeless Laws 
Antihomeless laws, which criminalize conduct associated with being 
homeless—including camping,23 sleeping,24 sitting or lying down,25 and 
loitering26—take inspiration from the “broken windows” approach to law 
enforcement. According to this theory, failing to control low-level crime 
causes the proliferation of more serious offenses.27 In line with this view, 
proponents of antihomeless laws have argued that antihomeless laws are 
needed because the “mere presence of street homeless in the public sphere has 
the effect of unraveling the social order, leading to an increase in crime and 
thereby driving middle- and upper-class consumers out of downtown areas.”28 
 
Brass knuckles, stun guns, a hammer—all found inside lockers. An entire section of 
the shelter is known for “high drug activity.” 
Greg B. Smith, How Shelter Chaos Drives Many Homeless to Live on Streets and in Subways, CITY (Nov. 18, 
2019, 4:15 AM), https://www.thecity.nyc/special-report/2019/11/18/21210717/how-shelter-chaos-drives-
many-homeless-to-live-on-streets-and-in-subways [https://perma.cc/ZYS4-97AG]. 
23 Tulsa, Oklahoma, has a camping ban that makes it is unlawful to “take up one’s abode” in 
public. TULSA, OKLA., TULSA CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 27, ch. 18, § 1800(A)(2) (2020). 
24 Atlanta, Georgia, has a sleeping ban that prohibits both “sleeping” and “making preparations 
to sleep” in public. ATLANTA, GA., ATLANTA CITY CODE pt. II, ch. 106, art. I, § 106-12(a) (2020). 
25 Richmond, Virginia, has a law that makes it unlawful to “sit or lie” in any way that obstructs 
the “free normal flow” of pedestrian traffic. RICHMOND, VA., RICHMOND CODE ch. 19, art. V, div. 
1, § 19-110 (b), (c)(1) (2020). 
26 Toledo, Ohio, prohibits “hanging around” in a way that creates an “unreasonable annoyance 
to the comfort and repose of any person.” TOLEDO, OHIO, MUNICIPAL CODE pt. 5, ch. 509, 
§ 509.08(a), (b)(1) (2020). 
27 James Wilson and George Kelling popularized this theory in their seminal 1982 article Broken 
Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety. They argued that “[at the community level, disorder and] 
crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and 
police officers tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest 
of the windows will soon be broken.” James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The 
Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, at 29, 31. 
28 Donald Saelinger, Note, Nowhere to Go: The Impacts of City Ordinances Criminalizing 
Homelessness, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 545, 553 (2006). 
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But the merits of this broken-windows approach to law enforcement are 
highly contested.29 The New York Police Department, for example, has found 
“no empirical evidence demonstrating a clear and direct link between an 
increase in summons and misdemeanor arrest activity and a related drop in 
felony crime.”30 Research shows that broken-windows tactics are similarly 
ineffective in the homelessness context: rather than deterring crime, 
antihomeless laws force homeless individuals “into more secluded, less 
familiar locations where they are more vulnerable,” increasing the risk of 
violent crime against them.31  
Opponents of these laws argue that they entrench a cycle of homelessness 
and poverty. The cycle begins when an individual is cited or arrested for 
violating an ordinance, which requires the offender to appear in court to enter 
a plea.32 For someone struggling to survive on the streets, the mere act of 
traveling to court, much less navigating the criminal justice system, is no easy 
task. And if past court orders and sentences have contributed to their plight, 
homeless individuals may fear returning to court. Not surprisingly, a research 
study found that nearly sixty percent of homeless offenders in Austin, Texas, 
failed to appear for their hearing, leading to the issuance of arrest warrants.33 
When a warrant is issued, the homeless individual’s next offense then 
invariably leads to arrest and detention, the cost of which “far exceeds the 
amount of the original fine they would have had to pay.”34 These consequences 
can cause prolonged work interruptions, which may in turn lead to a reduction 
in shift hours or the loss of employment.35 Because homeless offenders face great 
pressure to “plead guilty and end the ordeal of detention,”36 offenders return to 
 
29 See, e.g., Nick Malinowski, Useful or Not, Broken Windows Policing Remains Morally 
Indefensible, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nick-malinowski/useful-
or-not-broken-wind_b_10742902.html [https://perma.cc/2VW6-ZF73]. 
30 MARK G. PETERS & PHILIP K. EURE, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION, AN ANALYSIS 
OF QUALITY-OF-LIFE SUMMONSES, QUALITY-OF-LIFE MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS, AND FELONY 
CRIME IN NEW YORK CITY, 2010-2015, at 3 (2016), https://www.nyc.gov/assets/oignypd/downloads/ 
pdf/Quality-of-Life-Report-2010-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9H7-ZWJY]. 
31 NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, supra note 5, at 66. 
32 See MADELINE BAILEY, ERICA CREW & MADZ REEVE, VERA INST. OF JUST., NO ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF HOMELESSNESS AND JAIL 6 (2020), https:// 
www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/homelessness-brief-web.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/GRN5-P3V8]. 
33 See Andrew Weber, Most Tickets for Homelessness Result in Arrest Warrants. That Can Make 
Finding Housing Hard., KUT 90.5 (June 20, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.kut.org/austin/2019-06-
20/most-tickets-for-homelessness-result-in-arrest-warrants-that-can-make-finding-housing-hard 
[https://perma.cc/Y3Q5-CRVA]. 
34 John J. Ammann, Essay, Addressing Quality of Life Crimes in Our Cities: Criminalization, 
Community Courts and Community Compassion, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 811, 819 (2000). 
35 Id. at 28. Homeless individuals may also lose their personal belongings while incarcerated, 
which can make returning to work upon release more difficult. Id. 
36 See BAILEY, CREW & REEVE, supra note 32, at 8. 
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the street not only homeless but criminally convicted—a status that makes 
finding work and achieving long-lasting independence all the more challenging.37 
B. The Elements of Antihomeless Laws 
Antihomeless laws highlight a foundational criminal law question: What type 
of conduct may be punished by the state? The outer limits of what may constitute 
a crime are rooted in the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against inflicting 
cruel and unusual punishment.38 Within those boundaries, however, the 
particularities of criminal law are codified in federal, state, and local penal codes. 
A criminal defendant may be found guilty of a crime if and only if the 
government proves all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.39 
The mens rea element requires the state to show that the defendant had a guilty 
mind.40 Strict liability crimes, which are more controversial,41 have no mens rea 
requirement: defendants may be liable regardless of their mental state when 
committing the criminal act. Many antihomeless laws are strict liability 
offenses.42 But even if these laws included a mens rea element, homeless 
individuals would satisfy it: they intentionally engage in the prohibited conduct 
to sustain their own survival and are aware when they do so in public. 
The actus reus element, as defined by the Model Penal Code, requires a 
“voluntary act.”43 This requirement is best understood by separately analyzing 
each component of the term “voluntary act.” First, the need for an “act” limits 
the behaviors appropriate for criminal punishment to conduct (or to 
 
37 See Jamie Michael Charles, Note, “America’s Lost Cause”: The Unconstitutionality of 
Criminalizing Our Country’s Homeless Population, 18 PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 345 (2009) (“A criminal record 
makes their presence on the streets more certain because individuals with criminal records have a 
difficult time finding work.”). 
38 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
“imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such”). For a discussion 
of those limits, see infra Section II.A. 
39 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
40 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. L. INST. 1985). The Model Penal Code defines four 
levels of culpability—purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence—any of which may serve as 
the mens rea for an offense. Id. 
41 Professor Stephen Morse, in a critique of strict liability crimes, well captured the desirability 
of the mens rea element in our criminal code: “As long as we continue to treat each other as persons 
and to value moral life, however, and do not simply treat each other as potentially dangerous 
machines, the harmdoer’s attitude towards the victim, expressed by mental states, will be crucial to 
our emotional, moral and practical response.” Stephen J. Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 27 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 51, 63 (2003). 
42 See David M. Smith, Note, A Theoretical and Legal Challenge to Homeless Criminalization as 
Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 487, 494 (1994) (“It is especially worth noting that homeless 
survival is often the intended target of some strict liability crimes that do not require any mens 
rea.”); see also, e.g., antihomeless ordinances cited supra notes 23–26. 
43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 1985). 
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omissions, where one has a duty to act).44 A thought or physical condition may 
not be criminalized. Second, the need for the criminal act to be “voluntary” 
requires the offender to purposely move his body.45 As Oliver Wendell 
Holmes wrote, voluntariness requires more than a muscular contraction; the 
“contraction of the muscles must be willed.”46 
Antihomeless laws that criminalize camping, sitting or lying down, or 
loitering all target voluntary acts: homeless individuals intentionally engage 
in this conduct to survive. Sleeping bans also punish voluntary acts, but the 
voluntary act that these laws punish is not as apparent as other categories of 
antihomeless laws because sleeping is an unconscious state. But unless 
someone suddenly and unexpectedly falls asleep, the acts that precede sleep, 
which may include sitting or lying down, are voluntary, satisfying the actus 
reus requirement.47 
II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL STATUS CRIMES 
Those who challenge antihomeless laws in court often argue that they 
unconstitutionally inflict cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. Two Supreme Court cases—Robinson and Powell—provide 
the fundamental principles that guide this analysis. Even though the Court 
did not hold in either case that anything more than a voluntary act is required 
to criminally punish a person, lower federal courts, including the Ninth 
Circuit, have relied on the Court’s reasoning in those cases to strike down 
antihomeless laws. 
A. Robinson and Powell: The Status-Act Distinction 
Walter Lawrence Robinson, a drug addict, was riding in a car that was 
pulled over by a police officer in February 1960 for having an unilluminated 
rear license plate.48 During the traffic stop, the officer ordered Robinson to 
roll up his sleeves, which revealed “scar tissue and discoloration on the inside 
of his right arm, and numerous fresh needle marks on the inside of his left 
arm”—all of which are typical indicia of drug use.49 Robinson was arrested 
and charged with violating a California statute that made it a crime to “be 
 
44 Id. 
45 See Michael S. Moore, Reply, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 1827 (1994). 
46 O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 54 (1881). 
47 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“It is, however, 
required only that the actor’s conduct include a voluntary act, and thus unconsciousness preceded 
by voluntary action may lead to liability based upon the earlier conduct.”). 
48 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (No. 554). 
49 Id. at 5-6. 
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addicted to the use of narcotics.”50 He was found guilty and sentenced to 
ninety days in jail and two years’ probation.51 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Robinson argued that criminalizing his 
drug addiction violated the Eighth Amendment.52 The Court agreed, finding 
that “a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even 
though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty 
of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment.”53 
Robinson’s constitutional holding is clear: a person cannot be criminally 
punished for being an addict.54 Less apparent, however, is the principle on which 
the Court relied to determine that punishing addiction is cruel and unusual.55 
Three plausible rationales, each of which is outlined below, have been offered.56 
The simplest rationale is that criminal laws may punish people for their 
conduct (what they do), but not for their status (who they are). In Robinson, 
the Court recognized that because the California law punished addiction 
alone, it did not require the commission of any act.57 Justice Potter Stewart, 
writing for the majority, found this impermissible. The law, he wrote, did not 
punish the “unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or 
possession of narcotics.”58 A person could be “continuously guilty of this 
offense . . . whether or not he has been guilty of any antisocial behavior.”59 
Because the California law punished Robinson for his status, rather than his 
conduct, it was unconstitutional. 
The second rationale is less formalistic. It asks whether the individual is 
“free voluntarily to quit his condition.”60 Punishing people who cannot rid 
themselves of their illness or condition would serve no deterrent effect. 
Therefore, “in the light of contemporary human knowledge,” the Robinson 
Court decided that punishing such people “would doubtless be universally 
thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.”61 The Court 
 
50 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1962)). 
51 Brief of Appellee at 22, Robinson, 370 U.S. 660 (No. 554). 
52 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 48, at 29-31. 
53 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. 
54 Id. 
55 See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Choice, and Criminal Law, in ADDICTION & CHOICE: 
RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 426, 433 (Nick Heather & Gabriel Segal eds., 2017) (“It is 
difficult to determine precisely what reasoning was the foundation for the Court’s constitutional 
conclusion [in Robinson].”). 
56 These explanations were first offered in a Harvard Law Review note published shortly after 
the Robinson decision. Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal 
Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 646-55 (1966). 
57 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666. 
58 Id. at 664. 
59 Id. at 666. 
60 Note, supra note 56, at 648. 
61 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666. 
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compared the challenged California law to one that punished people for having 
a common cold, an illness that, like addiction, cannot be cured at will, and 
noted that neither law could be tolerated under the Eighth Amendment.62 
A third rationale is that punishment for any disease acquired “innocently 
or involuntarily” is unconstitutional.63 This principle paves the way for 
treating addiction, where the first use of drugs is often voluntary, differently 
than illnesses that are acquired without any meaningful choice, such as a 
common cold. Under this rationale, courts would not focus on whether a law 
punished a status or an act; they would instead decide only whether a 
defendant was ultimately responsible for his condition. 
Six years after Robinson was decided, the Court offered guidance to those 
who sought clarification of its true rationale. Leroy Powell was a sixty-six-
year-old chronic alcoholic who had been arrested for being drunk in public, 
by his estimation, approximately one hundred times.64 In December 1966, 
Powell was arrested and charged under a Texas law that prohibited being 
“found in a state of intoxication in any public place.”65 Powell appealed his 
conviction directly to the Supreme Court and encouraged the Justices to hold 
that punishing him for his public intoxication, like punishing him for the disease 
itself, was unconstitutional, because he was incapable of complying with the law.66 
Four Justices, in a plurality opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
declined Powell’s invitation. The plurality interpreted Robinson as holding 
that it is unconstitutional to punish mere status; any voluntary act, the 
plurality reasoned, may be punished under the Eighth Amendment.67 
According to Justice Marshall, “Robinson’s interpretation of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only 
if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which 
society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law 
terms, has committed some actus reus.”68 Justice Marshall then distinguished 
the law at issue in Powell from the one in Robinson by noting that Powell was 
convicted “not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while 
drunk on a particular occasion,” a voluntary act.69 
The dissent authored by Justice Abe Fortas, on the other hand, contended 
that Robinson prohibited punishing a defendant for “being in a condition he 
 
62 Id. at 667. 
63 Id. 
64 Brief for Appellee at 2, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (No. 405). 
65 Powell, 392 U.S. at 517 (plurality opinion) (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 477 (Vernon 1952)). 
66 See Reply Brief for Appellant at 10, Powell, 392 U.S. 514 (No. 405) (“Nowhere is it explained 
why it is less cruel to punish a symptom of a disease than to punish the disease itself.”). 
67 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 532 (plurality opinion). 
68 Id. at 533. 
69 Id. at 532. 
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is powerless to change.”70 Although the Texas law covered “more than a mere 
status,”71 distinguishing it from the one in Robinson, the dissent argued that 
both suffered from the same constitutional defect: each law allowed the 
government to punish a person for “being in a condition which he had no 
capacity to change or avoid.”72 According to the dissent, the Eighth 
Amendment prohibited punishing a person not only for having a disease but 
also for having “a compulsion symptomatic of the disease.”73 Thus, the 
Constitution prohibited the punishment of both Powell’s “uncontrollable 
compulsion to drink” and, once intoxicated, his inability to “prevent himself 
from appearing in public places.”74 
Justice Byron White concurred in the judgment, providing the decisive 
fifth vote to uphold the Texas law. On the one hand, he seemed sympathetic 
to the dissent’s disease rationale and surmised that if it “cannot be a crime to 
have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics,” then neither can it be a crime 
“to yield to such a compulsion.”75 On the other hand, he did not believe that 
Powell’s chronic alcoholism compelled him to “frequent public places when 
intoxicated,” the conduct for which Powell was prosecuted.76 Justice White 
thought the attribution of this behavior to Powell’s chronic alcoholism was 
“contrary to common sense and to common knowledge.”77 As a result, Justice 
White declined to prohibit the conviction of chronic alcoholics, like Powell, 
who “knowingly fail[] to take feasible precautions against committing a 
criminal act,” such as staying home when drinking.78 Because Justice White 
believed that Powell had been punished for a voluntary act, it was unnecessary 
for him to decide when, if ever, the Constitution prohibits states from 
punishing alcoholics who involuntarily yield to their compulsion to drink.79 
B. Antihomeless Laws in Lower Federal Courts 
Lower federal courts have looked to the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Robinson and Powell as guideposts to resolve constitutional challenges to 
 
70 Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 568. 
73 Id. at 569. The Court in Robinson did not have reason to address the constitutionality of 
punishing individuals for conduct symptomatic of a disease because Robinson, unlike Powell, was 
punished for being an addict per se. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
74 Powell, 392 U.S. at 568 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
75 Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
76 Id. at 549. 
77 Id. 
78 See id. at 550 (“On such facts the alcoholic is like a person with smallpox, who could be 
convicted for being on the street but not for being ill, or, like the epileptic, who could be punished 
for driving a car but not for his disease.”). 
79 Id. at 553-54. 
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antihomeless laws. Courts that have enjoined the enforcement of these laws 
under the Eighth Amendment have distinguished them from the Texas law in 
Powell on various grounds. Some courts have noted that unlike Powell, a 
chronic alcoholic who had a home in which he could have remained when 
drinking, homeless individuals without access to a shelter have nowhere but 
public spaces to live, forcing them to perform basic human conduct in public.80 
Other courts have interpreted Powell as defining the substantive limits of the 
Eighth Amendment based on more than the distinction between a status and 
an act. They have found relevant other factors, such as the involuntary and 
harmless nature of the criminalized conduct, and concluded based on those 
principles that antihomeless laws are unconstitutional.81 
In the most prominent decision taking on the constitutionality of 
antihomeless laws, the Ninth Circuit, in Martin v. City of Boise, applied the 
former approach discussed above to hold that two antihomeless ordinances in 
Boise, Idaho, which punished camping and sleeping in public, respectively, 
both violated the Eighth Amendment.82  
In October 2009, six homeless individuals from Boise sued the City to 
enjoin the enforcement of the laws, arguing that Boise’s lack of available 
shelter beds gave them no choice but to sleep outside, requiring this conduct 
 
80 See, e.g., Kohr v. City of Houston, No. 17-1473, 2017 WL 3605238, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 
2017) (“The evidence is conclusive that [homeless individuals] are involuntarily in public, harmlessly 
attempting to shelter themselves—an act they cannot realistically forgo . . . .”); Johnson v. City of 
Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 351 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (finding that homeless individuals can be punished 
only if there would be “some place to be other than in public” for them to go, because only then 
would they be “in the position of a Mr. Powell, who could be punished for conduct not inextricably 
intertwined in a status”), rev’d and vacated on other grounds, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); Pottinger v. 
City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“[T]he Powell plurality was not confronted 
with a critical distinguishing factor that is unique to the plight of the homeless plaintiffs in this case: 
that they have no realistic choice but to live in public places.”). 
81 See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (“As homeless 
individuals, Appellants are in a chronic state that may have been acquired ‘innocently or 
involuntarily.’” (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962))), vacated pursuant to 
settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007); Anderson v. City of Portland, No. 08-1447, 2009 WL 
2386056, at *7 (D. Or. July 31, 2009) (“I find that plaintiffs adequately state a claim under the Eighth 
Amendment, in that they allege that the City’s enforcement of the anti-camping and temporary 
structure ordinances criminalizes them for being homeless and engaging in the involuntary and 
innocent conduct of sleeping on public property.”). 
82 See Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 604 (9th Cir.) (“[We] hold that an ordinance 
violates the Eighth Amendment insofar as it imposes criminal sanctions against homeless 
individuals for sleeping outdoors, on public property, when no alternative shelter is available to 
them.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019). This opinion amended the original panel decision issued 
on September 4, 2018. See Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), amended by 920 
F.3d 584 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019). 
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to be protected under the Eighth Amendment.83 Each plaintiff in Martin had 
been convicted and served time for violating one or both of these ordinances.84 
The Ninth Circuit read Powell to mean that “criminal penalties may not be 
inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change.”85 The 
court arrived at this conclusion by reasoning that five Justices in Powell—Justice 
White and the four dissenting Justices—“gleaned from Robinson the principle 
that ‘that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the state from punishing an 
involuntary act or condition if it is the unavoidable consequence of one’s status 
or being.’”86 Based on that premise, the court reasoned that if a person does not 
have the option to sleep indoors, as was the case in Boise, criminalizing “sitting, 
sleeping, or lying outside on public property”87 is the same as punishing that 
person for an “unavoidable consequence of being homeless.”88 From there, the 
Ninth Circuit had little difficulty holding that Boise’s enforcement of the 
challenged ordinances was unconstitutional.89 
The impact of this decision cannot be overstated: “The nine states in the 
Ninth Circuit hold almost two-thirds of the country’s unsheltered 
homeless—California alone holds almost half—and many cities in those states 
don’t have enough shelter beds for them.”90 Martin thus provides a significant 
share of the nation’s homeless population with robust legal protections against 
laws that criminalize the “unavoidable consequences” of being homeless, such 
as sleeping on the street, in areas that lack adequate shelter space.91 
III. A MISTAKEN SOLUTION: THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
According to the Supreme Court, the Eighth Amendment’s limits on 
what a state may criminalize must be “applied sparingly.”92 The status-act 
distinction forged by the Court in Robinson and Powell represents the most 
expansive reading of these limits, beyond which the Court has never gone. 
The Martin court, in holding that no involuntary conduct may be punished, 
misread and overextended Supreme Court precedent. Furthermore, the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision espouses bad public policy; although the outcome 
 
83 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Robert Martin, et al. at 8, 23-25, Martin, 920 F.3d 584 (No. 15-35845). 
84 Martin, 920 F.3d at 606. 
85 Id. at 591 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 567 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting)). 
86 Id. at 616 (quoting Jones, 444 F.3d at 1135). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 617 (quoting Jones, 444 F.3d at 1137). 
89 Id. at 618. 
90 Scott Greenstone, How a Federal Court Ruling on Boise’s Homeless Camping Ban Has Rippled 
Across the West, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/homeless/a-federal-ruling-limiting-cities-from-criminalizing-homeless-has-rippled-across-
the-west [https://perma.cc/6BM6-A96L]. 
91 Martin, 920 F.3d at 617 (quoting Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136). 
92 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977). 
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may seem to help the homeless population, it will serve only to exacerbate 
the homelessness crisis. 
A. The Doctrinal Shortcomings of Relying on the Eighth Amendment 
Despite its best intentions, the Ninth Circuit in Martin made several 
missteps in applying the doctrine laid out in Robinson and Powell. First, the 
court improperly included Powell’s four dissenting Justices in deriving what 
it deemed binding precedent from the case. Second, the court read far too 
much into Justice White’s narrow concurring opinion. 
As no single opinion in Powell was supported by a majority of the Court, 
courts and scholars face a challenge in identifying what precedent, if any, the 
case established. To resolve dilemmas such as this one, the Supreme Court 
has fashioned the Marks rule.93 This rule, named after the Court’s decision in 
Marks v. United States, requires lower courts applying Supreme Court 
plurality decisions to view the holding of the case as the “position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”94 
Despite this instruction from the Supreme Court, in applying Powell, the 
Ninth Circuit in Martin instead counted the four dissenting Justices and 
Justice White to conclude that Powell prevents Boise from punishing 
homeless individuals who have nowhere to sleep.95 That analysis is 
inconsistent with the framework established in Marks. Under the Marks rule, 
dissenting Justices, unlike Justices who participate or concur in the judgment, 
cannot bind lower courts.96 For the Court’s opinion in Powell, the narrowest 
rationale shared by the plurality and concurrence is that Powell could be 
punished under the Texas law because his appearance in public while drunk 
was a voluntary act.97 If five concurring Justices had held that a voluntary act 
was insufficient under the Eighth Amendment to punish a defendant, the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Powell would be compelling. However, because 
four out of the five Justices on whom the Martin panel relied had dissented, 
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning misses the mark. 
Rather than applying the Marks rule, the Martin court read Powell as a 
dual-majority decision. This approach offers an alternative way to interpret 
fragmented Supreme Court opinions where no rationale was adopted by five 
 
93 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
94 Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
95 Martin, 920 F.3d at 616-17. 
96 Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. 
97 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1968) (plurality opinion); id. at 549 n.1 (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
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Justices.98 In dual-majority cases, when five Justices across the dissenting and 
concurring opinions agree regarding the law, their rationale binds lower 
courts, despite their disagreement as to how that law applies to the facts of 
the case.99 But relying on the dual-majority approach in fractured Supreme 
Court decisions squarely disregards the Court’s mandate to apply the Marks 
rule to such cases.100 Marks made clear that the technical alignment of the 
Justices matters, and its rule remains good law today.101 
But even if the dual-majority approach did not contravene the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Marks, its application to Powell would not necessarily 
dictate the outcome the Ninth Circuit reached in Martin. At best, the Ninth 
Circuit’s preferred reading of Powell rests on the dicta of a Justice who 
avoided deciding the constitutional issue. As explained above, four Justices in 
Powell upheld the Texas statute because it punished conduct, not status.102 
Justice White concurred in this result because “Powell could have drunk at 
home and made plans while sober to prevent ending up in a public place.”103 
Powell’s conduct, according to Justice White, was voluntary; it was not a 
symptom of his chronic alcoholism.104 This reading of the facts led Justice 
White to not adopt the dissent’s rationale that conduct symptomatic of a 
condition is protected from punishment.105 Thus, the Ninth Circuit read into 
Justice White’s concurrence a rationale he never adopted. 
B. Why Relying on Constitutional Doctrine Is Poor Public Policy 
“The Constitution,” Justice Antonin Scalia once wrote, “is not an all-
purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world.”106 Courts that use 
it as one, he warned, risk “swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is 
 
98 See Nina Varsava, The Role of Dissents in the Formation of Precedent, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
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99 Varsava, supra note 98, at 289. 
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103 Id. at 553 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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drunk in a public place.”). 
106 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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needed.”107 Although using the Eighth Amendment to enjoin the 
enforcement of antihomeless laws provides litigants with the semblance of 
relief, that constitutional remedy is both over- and underinclusive. 
The Eighth Amendment approach is overinclusive because the doctrine 
imprudently protects all life-sustaining functions that homeless people 
perform in public. Although conduct not correlative of homelessness, such as 
trespassing or stealing food, remains punishable, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
puts much conduct beyond the reach of criminal law. Homeless people, for 
example, in addition to needing sleep, must urinate and defecate. Under the 
reasoning offered in Martin, a homeless person who does so in public, assuming 
no public restrooms are available nearby, cannot be criminally punished.108 
The problematic implications of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning are even 
more striking in other contexts. Kleptomaniacs, arsonists, and other mentally 
ill individuals also have criminal compulsions that are symptomatic of their 
conditions. Punishing members of these subsets of the population for their 
conduct—like punishing the homeless for sleeping in public when shelter 
space is unavailable—can be viewed as punishing an involuntary act, which is 
unconstitutional under Martin’s reasoning. Indeed, a few years after Powell 
was decided, the D.C. Circuit expressed “war[iness] of the multitude of acts 
which are now crimes and which might have to be excused if . . . ‘the original 
boundaries of Robinson are to be discarded.’”109 In contrast to the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach, punishing criminals without regard for whether their 
conduct is a symptom of a condition promotes compliance with the law. After 
a series of voluntary decisions, a criminal defendant should not be able to 
prevail by claiming, “I couldn’t help myself.”110 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Martin is also underinclusive. As the 
decision acknowledges, the rule of Martin fails to protect many homeless 
individuals “who do have access to adequate temporary shelter” but, for any 
number of reasons, “choose not to use it.”111 Homeless individuals, especially 
those who work late into the night, may be unable to abide by a shelter’s 
curfew.112 The largest shelter in Houston, Texas, for example, has a 5:00 PM 
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curfew, which is “totally unrealistic for getting a job in the real world.”113 
Other homeless individuals may have safety concerns about sleeping in a 
shelter, which often provide them with little protection against other 
residents who are dangerous.114 Even sheltered homeless individuals are 
eventually forced to sleep in public after they stay the maximum number of 
consecutive nights that the shelter permits.115 Shelters, therefore, merely 
delay the unfortunate reality that many people without a home will one day 
be forced to sleep on the street. 
The Ninth Circuit’s attempt to ameliorate the homelessness crisis by 
constitutionalizing matters of criminal law is ultimately misguided. As 
explained in the previous Section, a majority of the Supreme Court has never 
held that involuntary conduct categorically cannot be punished. Although the 
“interpretation that Robinson held that it was not criminal to give in to the 
irresistible compulsions of a ‘disease[]’ weaves in and out of 
the Powell opinions, . . . there is definitely no Supreme Court holding to this 
effect.”116 Given the absence of such a holding, the Ninth Circuit’s reading is 
mistaken. The Eighth Amendment also serves as a rather blunt instrument 
when used to address the ills that antihomeless laws present. Prosecutors, as 
explained in the next Part, are far better equipped than courts to mitigate the 
harms that these laws perpetrate. 
IV. A PROSECUTORIAL SOLUTION: DISCRETIONARY 
ENFORCEMENT OF ANTIHOMELESS LAWS 
Prosecutorial discretion is foundational to the American criminal justice 
system. Rather than punishing every criminal offender, prosecutors are 
vested with discretion to decide who should—and should not—be prosecuted. 
Federal, state, and local prosecutors’ offices regularly adopt policies that guide 
the exercise of this discretion.117 To help those closest to escaping 
homelessness, this Comment argues that law enforcement officers should not 
 
[https://perma.cc/TCB8-Y2C9] (explaining that many homeless individuals “have jobs that might 
keep them out past the shelter curfew”). 
113 Kayla Robbins, What Is It Like to Stay in a Homeless Shelter?, INVISIBLE PEOPLE (Oct. 7, 
2019), https://www.invisiblepeople.tv/what-is-it-like-to-stay-in-a-homeless-shelter [https://perma.cc/ 
4UPV-S2U2]. 
114 See id. (“When the stranger bunked next to you (and the staff) are high as a kite on every 
substance known to man, you risk being assaulted, raped, or killed.”). 
115 In Boise, Idaho, for instance, some shelters “limit the length of time any one person can 
stay to a maximum of seventeen or thirty days after which they may not return for a period of thirty 
days.” Brief of Appellants at 33, Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-35674). 
116 United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (plurality opinion). 
117 See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 
DICK. L. REV. 589, 597 (2019). 
2021] A Prosecutorial Solution to the Criminalization of Homelessness 1989 
prosecute homeless individuals for violating antihomeless laws if they are 
either working or seeking work. 
A. The Benefits of Prosecutorial Discretion 
The discretionary enforcement of our criminal laws is not simply a 
regrettable byproduct of scarce criminal justice resources; it is essential to 
doing justice. The alternative, prosecuting every offender for every crime, 
would be an injustice.118 Two components of a prosecutor’s discretion, the 
power to forego charging offenders and the authority to divert defendants out 
of the criminal justice system, have the greatest potential to forestall the 
harms inflicted by antihomeless laws. 
1. Declination 
“What every prosecutor is practically required to do,” former Attorney 
General Robert Jackson explained, “is to select the cases for prosecution and 
to select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the 
greatest, and the proof the most certain.”119 A prosecutor’s discretion not to 
charge a criminal defendant is at its zenith for minor offenses. When the harm 
is slight and the offender is not dangerous, there is a “natural temptation to 
‘have it both ways’ by not prosecuting misconduct that most people are usually 
willing to let go unpunished, while still defining the conduct as criminal in 
order not to appear to condone it.”120 Declining to charge homeless individuals 
for violating antihomeless laws saves them from the collateral consequences 
that follow criminal prosecution, which, among other hardships, may include 
loss of work and barriers to re-entering the workforce.121 
2. Diversion 
Even when prosecutors bring criminal charges, they can use their 
discretion to redirect defendants out of the criminal justice system. Offenders 
may apply to their local prosecutor’s office for their cases to be diverted, which 
would allow them to complete “an alternative program or sentence rather than 
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incarceration.”122 The criminal case against the defendant is then dismissed 
upon satisfaction of the diversion program’s conditions.123 Diversion programs 
are often used for drug offenses, but are now available for many other minor 
crimes.124 Approximately seventy diversion programs have been set up across 
the country to divert homeless individuals out of the criminal justice system 
for nonviolent, low-level offenses, including violations of antihomeless laws.125 
These initiatives not only spare the state the cost—and the defendant the 
harm—that accompanies criminal prosecution, but also help rehabilitate rather 
than incarcerate offenders. 
B. Protecting the Working and Job-Seeking Homeless from Prosecution 
The Martin panel and other federal courts that have struck down 
antihomeless laws may well have believed that it would be unjust to punish 
the homeless for their life-sustaining conduct. After all, many unsheltered 
homeless people have nowhere but public spaces to live, so it is difficult, if 
not impossible, for them to avoid breaking these laws. Striking down these 
laws, however, undermines the holding that Marks compels lower courts to 
glean from Powell—that any voluntary conduct, even if it is allegedly 
compelled, may be punished.  
To address the homelessness crisis while still comporting with the 
Constitution and Supreme Court precedent, prosecutors should adopt 
policies that aim to apply antihomeless laws more fairly.  
Namely, when prosecutors know that a homeless defendant is seeking to 
enter, or is already in, the workforce, they should decline to file charges 
against that person. In cases where charges are filed, homeless defendants 
who prove their employment or job-seeking status should be diverted out of 
the criminal justice system and into homeless court programs. 
These policies would be easy to implement, as evidenced by the dozens of 
already successfully operating homeless diversion programs. Police officers 
interacting with homeless individuals who have violated antihomeless laws 
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should inquire into those individuals’ employment status. If a homeless 
person claims to be working or seeking work, the officer can assess the 
assertion’s reliability before documenting it in the police report. Supporting 
evidence, such as a pay stub or employee badge, can help verify employment. 
Even without these kinds of supporting materials, police officers may credit 
a homeless individual’s claim about his employment status. Given their face-
to-face contact with homeless individuals, officers are well suited to evaluate 
the homeless individual’s credibility. The individual’s employment status 
(employed, unemployed and seeking work, or unemployed and not seeking 
work) should then be recorded in the police report. 
As is often the case, prosecutors would then rely on the information 
captured in the police report—here, the homeless offender’s employment 
status—to make their charging decisions.126 Prosecutors should decline 
charges when the police report includes a finding that the homeless person is 
working or seeking work. But even if a homeless offender refuses to speak to 
the police officer or is unemployed and not seeking work, prosecution should 
not be a foregone conclusion. 
If charges are brought, homeless individuals should be diverted into a 
program that promises dismissal of the case against them if they prove that they 
are working or looking for a job within a predetermined period of time—say, 
sixty days from the date of arrest. As a first step toward accepting responsibility 
for their offense, homeless defendants should be required to enroll with a 
caseworker at a homeless shelter who handles the program’s admission 
process.127 Once enrolled, defendants would work with caseworkers to look 
for and obtain employment.128 Caseworkers are in a position to both help 
homeless individuals look for work and verify that they have done so in 
satisfaction of the program’s terms.129 Defendants who begin to look for work 
or find a job would then be put on the calendar for the next homeless court 
hearing, a special court session held at a host homeless shelter.130 These 
defendants would also be provided with an advocacy letter verifying their 
employment status.131 At the subsequent homeless court hearing, the 
homeless defendant would present the letter to the prosecutor, who will then 
confirm the homeless individual’s employment status and ask the court to 
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dismiss the case.132 Ultimately, homeless defendants could leave court without 
a criminal record and with the hope of becoming financially independent. 
*      *      * 
This proposal not only avoids reinforcing the Ninth Circuit’s 
misinterpretation of the Court’s holdings in Robinson and Powell but also 
remedies the under- and overinclusive nature of the Martin rule. 
First, it avoids the underinclusive nature of Martin’s reliance on the 
Eighth Amendment, which does not prevent states from punishing homeless 
people who can sleep elsewhere but nonetheless choose to sleep in public 
spaces.133 Even those homeless individuals who can comply with shelter 
curfews may still prefer to sleep on the street for safety or health reasons or 
because it allows them to stay together with family members from whom they 
would be separated in the shelter system.134 Under the proposal outlined 
above, working and job-seeking homeless individuals who sleep in public 
would not be prosecuted, regardless of whether a shelter bed is available. 
Second, by linking prosecution with employment status rather than broad 
notions of involuntariness, this Comment’s proposal bypasses the 
overinclusive aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s holding as well. Although this 
proposal leaves homeless individuals who are neither working nor seeking 
work vulnerable to prosecution, that is a feature, not a bug. 
The homeless population that remains subject to prosecution under the 
approach outlined above can be divided into two groups. First, there are 
unemployed homeless individuals who are physically and mentally able to 
work but are neither employed nor seeking employment. This Comment’s 
proposal strives to motivate those individuals to seek work and obtain an 
income that will allow them to afford housing, ending the devastating cycle of 
homelessness.135 Fear of losing Social Security income and Medicaid benefits 
“has proved to be the greatest deterrent to employment,” making it difficult 
to put some homeless individuals on the path toward self-sufficiency.136 This 
proposal helps offenders overcome this deterrent: if offenders can avoid 
prosecution, even after they are charged, by entering into a homeless court 
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program, they will connect with caseworkers who can help them find work and 
get back on their feet. Second, this proposal does not cover the subset of 
homeless individuals who are not able to maintain employment or seek work, 
perhaps due to mental illness. This group of people already has the least to 
lose from a criminal prosecution—they cannot be employed or seek 
employment. This group does, however, stand to benefit from this proposal. 
The decrease in the homeless population that will result from the employment 
and housing of those who can work will allow existing mental health services 
to more easily meet the needs of those that need them the most. 
CONCLUSION 
Antihomeless laws “reflect the hope rather than the expectation” that 
homelessness can be solved by a stroke of a legislature’s pen.137 Indeed, cycling 
through the criminal justice system makes it significantly harder for homeless 
individuals to escape their plight. Working or job-seeking homeless 
persons—those closest to achieving sustainable independence—have the 
most to lose from criminal prosecution and conviction. 
The doctrinal and policy shortcomings of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Martin underscore the need to rethink the role courts play in the 
homelessness crisis. The legal cure forged by the court—namely, striking 
down antihomeless laws for violating the Eighth Amendment—misreads 
Supreme Court precedent and fails to target the root cause of the 
homelessness crisis.  
If prosecutors decline to prosecute, and offer a diversion program to, those 
who are in or looking to join the workforce, much of the harm antihomeless 
laws inflict would be alleviated. This use of prosecutorial discretion not only 
accords with communal notions of fairness, but also, especially during a 
pandemic, may save the lives of some of society’s most vulnerable citizens. 
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